Governing Without a Majority: Lula’s Challenge After the Ballot

Note: The views expressed in this text are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of this website.

An illustration of President Lula facing a fragmented National Congress, with the political challenge of governing Brazil without a parliamentary majority, negotiating support, and building alliances within a landscape of intense polarization. (Illustration created by AI)

Lula’s re-election kept Bolsonarism out of the presidential palace, but not out of Congress. His next term will require more political calculation than mobilization, as he will have to govern without a majority. Lula’s re-election was narrow. He won 51.79% of the valid votes, against 48.21% for Flávio Bolsonaro. The country emerged from the election almost evenly divided, and the legislature that will take office in 2027 reflects this division, with a more right-leaning profile than that of the electorate that chose the president.

The Political Landscape of Governing Without a Majority

The numbers help illustrate the scale of the challenge. The Liberal Party (PL) elected 121 members of the Chamber of Deputies and 28 senators, making it the largest bloc in the Senate. Adding lawmakers from other parties aligned with Bolsonarism, the Bolsonaro-aligned bloc in the Senate is estimated to reach 44 of the 81 senators. These figures depend on the criteria used for classification. Different analyses arrive at similar, though not identical, totals, and what matters is the overall scale.

In my view, precision in terminology is essential, because saying that the far right "remains in power" is an oversimplification. The Executive Branch belongs to Lula. What the opposition controls is the Legislative Branch, which has gained influence in recent years. The power Congress has acquired over budget amendments remains unchanged, regardless of who occupies the presidency. Lula’s problem, therefore, is structural and goes beyond the rivalry between political parties. Any president would have to negotiate with a Congress that controls a substantial share of discretionary spending.

The Senate and the Centrão

The difficulty is concentrated in the Senate. A constitutional amendment requires 308 votes in the Chamber of Deputies and 49 in the Senate, while the impeachment of Supreme Court justices would require 54 senators. The government may be able to block extreme opposition initiatives, but it has little power to pass its own agenda without support from the political center. The elections for the presidencies of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, scheduled for February 2027, will be the first test of the new balance of power. With 28 senators, the PL would need 13 votes from allies to elect the Senate president. Whoever controls the leadership boards controls the agenda and the committees.

The composition of the Federal Senate and the main voting thresholds. The chart also highlights the thresholds required for important decisions: an absolute majority (41 votes), approval of a constitutional amendment in two rounds (49 votes, or three-fifths), and the removal of a Supreme Court justice (54 votes). (AI-generated image)

There is no consensus among analysts regarding the cost of building closer ties with the Centrão. Political scientist Carlos Ranulfo downplays the problem because Lula has already governed with a hostile Congress, and the difference in the Chamber of Deputies is expected to be small. Meanwhile, Professor Luciana Veiga, from FGV, believes the concessions Lula will have to make will be greater than those Flávio Bolsonaro would have needed to offer.

Both interpretations have merit. The Centrão remains a decisive political force, and the PL, despite its growth, is still a minority. At the same time, the PL's expansion came at the expense of parties such as PSD, PP, União Brasil, and MDB, which lost ground. A smaller Centrão may negotiate more cautiously, while a larger PL may attract lawmakers whom the government had counted on as allies.

There is, however, one factor working in the government's favor. Part of the PL's growth can be explained by the pursuit of party resources rather than ideological commitment. If Bolsonarism loses strength following Flávio's defeat and the internal struggle over the group's political legacy, some members of this bloc may shift their positions. It is a reasonable possibility, but it remains a gamble.

Popular Mobilization

Among government allies, the idea of using popular mobilization as a counterweight to Congress is gaining traction. Ending the 6x1 work schedule is the preferred example. It is a real case of public pressure that moved lawmakers, and the campaign showed that the progressive camp has learned to compete on social media through simple and coordinated messaging. However, this model has limitations that its supporters tend to underestimate. The first concerns the nature of the issue: the 6x1 work schedule is a concrete and popular topic, with immediate and visible benefits. Reforms with more diffuse effects, such as fiscal or tax reforms, are unlikely to mobilize crowds.

The second limitation is fatigue. Permanent mobilization wears down the political base, and a government that treats Congress as a public adversary risks hardening resistance rather than weakening it. The third is the lack of structure. Lula did not adopt this strategy over the past four years. The campaign's mobilization depended largely on digital leaders, such as Congressman André Janones, who are not government institutions and may not carry over into the administration.

There is also a risk of political misinterpretation. Nearly half of the electorate voted for the opposition, and treating this group as a homogeneous bloc of the "far right" is a strategic mistake. After all, governing also means addressing the concerns of this segment of the country, without assuming that an electoral victory eliminates the reasons behind its dissatisfaction. Some voters supported the opposition for economic, security-related, or values-based reasons, and they can be reached by those willing to listen to them. Treating them solely as enemies means giving up political ground that the democratic right itself is competing for.

What Is at Stake

The government faces two opposing risks. The first is the paralysis of a minority government that loses votes and sees the budget being decided by others. The second is the surrender of a government that makes so many concessions in the name of governability that nothing remains of the platform on which it was elected. The solution many advocate—combining political accommodation with the Centrão and pressure from the streets—is plausible, but it does not resolve the problem on its own.

In practice, Lula will have to balance three things that work against one another: negotiating without diluting his political platform, applying pressure without breaking bridges, and keeping together a broad coalition that loses its common enemy once the campaign ends. The outcome will depend less on slogans than on the ability to count votes, choose battles, and accept partial defeats. The February 2027 elections will be the first concrete measure of this ability.