Latin America and Africa: a lasting partnership or short-term enthusiasm?

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Meeting of Heads of State of CELAC-Africa, in Bogotá, Colombia, 03/21/2026. (Photo: Ricardo Stuckert / PR)

The recent intensification of relations between Latin America and Africa can be read as both ambition and insecurity. Countries of the Global South are once again testing the possibility of acting together, as an axis, within the context of a world where traditional hierarchies are under dispute.

The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, by promoting a forum with African countries, embodies this attempt to build autonomy. Since its creation, the bloc has carried the ambition of offering a space for political coordination without the presence of Northern powers, especially the United States. As such, CELAC functions as a symbol of a recurring desire in Latin America: to speak with its own voice. In this context, the rapprochement with Africa emerges almost as a natural development. Not only for historical reasons, although the weight of the African diaspora in Latin American formation is central, but because both regions share a similar structural position. South-South cooperation, therefore, is also an attempt to rebalance these conditions.

Leaders such as Gustavo Petro and Francia Márquez (president and vice president of Colombia) and Lula, president of Brazil, have been particularly explicit in articulating this vision. Foreign policy toward Africa combines three dimensions that rarely appear together with such clarity: identity, strategy, and institutional reform. By emphasizing Afro-descendant ties, governments seek to politically legitimize this rapprochement; by expanding commercial and diplomatic relations, they aim to make it pragmatic; and by creating permanent structures within the state, they attempt to ensure its continuity.

This combination is relevant because it touches on the most sensitive point: its durability. Recent Latin American history is marked by intense political cycles, in which changes in government often mean abrupt changes in international orientation. The past offers clear examples. During the so-called “pink tide” at the beginning of the 21st century, there was a similar push toward Africa, accompanied by strong rhetoric of solidarity among Global South countries. At that time, cooperation was largely sustained by ideological affinities. When that political cycle faded, many of these initiatives lost momentum. Not necessarily because they were unviable, but because they had not been fully incorporated as state policies. This is the risk looming over the current moment. The relatively limited presence of Latin American leaders at recent meetings indicates that enthusiasm is not uniform and, more importantly, that it still depends heavily on who is in power.

CELAC-Africa High-Level Forum, at the Ágora Convention Center. In the photo (from left to right): Prime Minister of Guyana, Mark Phillips; President of Brazil, Lula; President of Colombia, Gustavo Petro; Prime Minister of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Godwin Friday; and the President of Uruguay, Yamandú Orsi. In Bogotá, Colombia, March 21, 2026. (Photo: Ricardo Stuckert / PR)

At the same time, reducing this movement to a left-wing agenda would be an oversimplification. The history of Latin American foreign policy itself shows that the search for partnerships in the Global South is not an ideological monopoly. At different moments, including under conservative or authoritarian governments, countries in the region have sought to diversify their international relations, whether out of economic necessity or strategic calculation. What seems new, therefore, is the context in which this occurs. Today, the international order is more fragmented and competitive. Middle powers seek greater room for maneuver, while major powers compete for influence in regions once considered peripheral. Africa, in particular, has become a central arena in this dispute. For Latin American countries, approaching the African continent is not only a gesture of historical solidarity, but also a way to avoid being sidelined in ongoing global rearrangements.

On the other hand, this same global competition imposes limits. The growing presence of actors such as China, the European Union, and other traditional partners means that Latin America and Africa are meeting in an already densely contested space. This requires their cooperation to go beyond political declarations and find concrete niches of complementarity. Otherwise, it risks being overshadowed by more consolidated relationships. This is where the institutional dimension comes in, perhaps the most decisive factor for the future of this rapprochement. The opening of embassies, the creation of permanent dialogue mechanisms, and the incorporation of the issue into state bureaucracies are signs that something more durable may be taking shape. Unlike short-term programs, these structures create inertia, making it politically and administratively more costly to abandon the relationship.

Still, institutions alone are not enough. They need to be sustained by real and continuous interests. If the relationship between Latin America and Africa remains anchored mainly in symbolism or short-term agendas, its sustainability will be fragile. On the other hand, if it can rely on clear mutual benefits, whether economic, technological, or political, it will have a better chance of enduring changes in government. Ultimately, the current moment highlights a longstanding tension in Latin American foreign policy: the oscillation between autonomy and dependence. The rapprochement with Africa represents a bet on autonomy, the idea that the Global South can build its own networks of cooperation and influence. But this bet still coexists with pressures pulling in the opposite direction, whether from the strength of traditional relationships or from internal political shifts.

Will this agenda manage to break free from the cyclical logic that has historically marked the region? If it remains tied to specific political moments, it will be just another chapter of fleeting enthusiasm. If, on the contrary, it manages to consolidate itself as state policy, it may signal something deeper: a gradual but significant change in how Latin America and Africa see themselves. In this sense, the success of this rapprochement will depend on the ability to transform intention into state policy. It is a less visible, slower, and more institutional task, and precisely for that reason, much more difficult.

References

MINISTÉRIO DAS RELAÇÕES EXTERIORES. Comunicado Conjunto dos Copresidentes do Primeiro Fórum de Alto Nível CELAC-África. Governo Federal. Disponível em: <https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/comunicado-conjunto-dos-copresidentes-do-primeiro-forum-de-alto-nivel-celac-africa>.

MINISTÉRIO DAS RELAÇÕES EXTERIORES. Declaração de Bogotá - X Cúpula dos Chefes de Estado e de Governo da Comunidade dos Estados da América Latina e do Caribe (CELAC). Governo Federal. Disponível em: <https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/declaracao-de-bogota-x-cupula-dos-chefes-de-estado-e-de-governo-da-comunidade-dos-estados-da-america-latina-e-do-caribe-celac>.