Philippines on the brink of rupture?

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Former President Rodrigo Duterte before the Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court on March 14, 2025. (Photo: International Criminal Court)

The case of Rodrigo Duterte is often being treated by the international press as a simple dispute between “international justice versus authoritarianism” or as just another chapter in the rivalry between the Duterte and Marcos families. But the real dimension of the episode is far deeper, because it reveals a simultaneous transformation of Philippine politics, the role of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the broader strategic dynamics of the Indo-Pacific itself.

The first important point is understanding that Duterte’s trial is taking place at a moment of political reorganization in the Philippines. The alliance between the Dutertes and Ferdinand Marcos Jr. represented a pact between two major regional power blocs in the country. The Marcos family has historically been rooted in the north and among the traditional elites connected to Manila. The Dutertes consolidated political strength in the south, especially in Mindanao, combining populist rhetoric, militarization of public security, and strong support among popular sectors tired of crime and state inequality.

When this coalition collapsed, the ICC became a tool within the domestic Philippine power struggle. Not necessarily because Marcos “controls” the court, but because the government stopped politically blocking the mechanisms that previously protected Duterte. The ICC depends entirely on the political openness offered by states, and without at least minimal cooperation from Philippine authorities, Duterte would probably never have reached The Hague.

At the same time, reducing this to mere political revenge between clans would also be insufficient. The Marcos Jr. government is trying to rebuild the Philippines’ international image after years in which the country became internationally associated with extrajudicial killings, institutional erosion, and diplomatic instability. Under Duterte, the Philippines pursued an extremely pragmatic and ambiguous foreign policy. Despite the country’s historic military proximity to the United States, Duterte moved closer to China, downplayed disputes in the South China Sea, and frequently attacked Washington and the European Union in his speeches. On many occasions, Duterte used Filipino post-colonial resentment as a political instrument, portraying Western criticism over human rights as expressions of foreign hypocrisy.

Marcos Jr. shifted this axis. His government dramatically deepened military cooperation with Washington, expanded American access to Philippine bases, and adopted a more assertive stance against China in maritime disputes. This repositioning made the Philippines an even more relevant part of the American strategy to contain China in the Indo-Pacific. In this context, the political weakening of the Dutertes benefits the Marcos coalition domestically and favors a strategic environment more aligned with U.S. interests in the region. This does not necessarily mean direct American coordination over the judicial case, but rather a transformation in the Philippine internal balance of power.

Another frequently ignored aspect is that Duterte remains extremely popular. Part of the international coverage creates the impression that his arrest represents a definitive political defeat. This does not correspond to Philippine reality. Support for Duterte, especially outside Manila’s urban elites, remains massive. For millions of Filipinos, the war on drugs is not primarily viewed as a human rights violation, but as the first time the state demonstrated strength against crime, drug trafficking, and everyday insecurity. A perspective in which violent public security policies can coexist with strong electoral legitimacy. Duterte did not govern despite the violence; in many respects, he governed because of it. Public support for his law-and-order rhetoric demonstrates how prolonged social crises can generate social acceptance of authoritarian methods, especially when traditional institutions are perceived as ineffective or corrupt.

For this reason, the trial carries enormous political risk. If it is internally perceived as a foreign imposition supported by Manila’s elites, the process may further strengthen the populist and nationalist sentiment associated with the Duterte clan. Sara Duterte herself partially benefits from this narrative of political persecution and external interference. Moreover, the case exposes something uncomfortable about the selectivity of international justice. Many Filipinos observe that leaders responsible for controversial wars in major powers rarely face similar proceedings. This fuels the perception that international courts act more aggressively against peripheral or politically vulnerable countries. Even among Duterte’s critics, there is debate about the extent to which the ICC can escape this image.

Historically, the court has focused on African civil wars, militias, and state collapse. The Philippine case is different because it involves a democratically elected leader in a country with relatively functional institutions, accused over domestic public security policies. This significantly expands the political reach of the court and creates precedents that may concern other governments around the world adopting aggressive anti-crime or counterinsurgency strategies.

Philippine senators are sworn in as jurors in the impeachment trial of Vice President Sara Duterte in the Senate chamber in Manila on May 18, 2026. (Photo: VCG)

Another central element is the impact on the Philippine political future. Duterte’s trial and Sara Duterte’s impeachment are directly connected to the 2028 presidential election. What is truly at stake is which political project will dominate the Philippines in the next decade: a highly personalist populist nationalism associated with the Dutertes, or a restoration of the traditional establishment represented by the Marcos family and its allies?

References

GUINTO, Joel. Sara Duterte: Philippines house impeaches VP for a second time. BBC News, 2026. Disponível em: <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cqlp21q4yq4o>.

GUINTO, Joel; SIMONETTE, Virma ; HOLLIGAN, Anna . Rodrigo Duterte: What’s at stake as ICC judges hear charges against ex-Philippine president? BBC News, 2026. Disponível em: <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c363xd6p1gxo>.

SMITH, Tom. ICC exposes democratic wounds in Philippines. JusticeInfo. Disponível em: <https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/159354-icc-exposes-democratic-wounds-in-philippines.html>.

XINHUA NEWS. Philippine Senate convenes as impeachment court to try VP Sara Duterte. Xinhua News. Disponível em: <https://english.news.cn/20260518/7d04854cea024aeebc961d040d23af11/c.html>.