Opinion: Cuba, the next target?

Note: The views expressed in this text are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of this website.

President Donald Trump, with the flags of the United States and Cuba in the background. (Photo: CNN)

Recent statements by the Trump administration reflect a continuity in the reorientation of the United States’ foreign policy strategy in the Caribbean, with a strong emphasis on economic outcomes and mechanisms of political control.

This approach has already been tested in contexts such as Venezuela, where Washington adopted a combination of maximum pressure, negotiated openings with internal sectors of the regime, and a willingness to accept partial power adjustments, as long as they are compatible with U.S. economic interests. After Nicolás Maduro’s removal, there was a prioritization of access to oil and regional stability, even without a complete institutional rupture in Venezuela by Washington.

The current administration appears willing to accept governments not necessarily aligned ideologically, provided they are functionally cooperative on matters of strategic and economic interest to the U.S. At the same time, the tone of political discourse remains characteristic of a Republican conservative, combining offers of negotiation with explicit expressions of coercion. Recent public statements, including claims about the possibility of “taking Cuba"¹ and the prerogative to “do whatever I want” with the island, reinforce the role of pressure as an instrument of diplomatic bargaining.

If Havana resists concessions considered minimal by Washington, historical patterns suggest that the administration could shift from economic pressure measures to more direct actions, not necessarily in the form of conventional intervention, but potentially through limited operations or support for internal dissident actors, as observed in Venezuela. While this model reduces the domestic political cost of direct intervention, it entails significant risks, such as the normalization of coercion as a foreign policy tool, prolonged institutional instability in target countries, and potential erosion of effective sovereignty in the region.

Cuba could follow a path similar to Venezuela: selective economic opening, attraction of external capital, and maintenance of the existing political structure with targeted adjustments, without systemic rupture. Currently, active negotiation channels exist between Washington and Havana, with ongoing discussions about possible gradual concessions. The outcome of this process will depend on the balance between the level of pressure the U.S. is willing to sustain and the degree of concessions the Cuban government will accept without compromising its internal stability. This calculation is further complicated by the growing presence and support of China in the Cuban economy, adding an additional strategic dimension to the struggle for influence in the Caribbean.

1. Donald Trump. “President Trump and Vice President JD Vance Participate in Signing Time, Mar. 16, 2026.” White House, 16 Mar. 2026, youtu.be/S9MXdLYgYkE.