Who controls the sky controls the war? Starlink and the new orbital power

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In many parts of the world, access to the internet is still limited or nonexistent. Remote regions, rural areas, conflict zones, and countries under authoritarian regimes often lack traditional connectivity infrastructure, such as fiber-optic cables or stable telecommunications networks. Moreover, in contexts of war or political instability, the internet can be physically destroyed or deliberately shut down by governments. This digital exclusion not only restricts access to information and the global economy but also compromises essential services such as healthcare, security, and emergency communication.

It was in this context that Starlink emerged, developed by the American company SpaceX, founded by Elon Musk. Starlink’s initial proposal was to provide high-speed internet to any location on the planet through a constellation of satellites in low Earth orbit. Unlike traditional satellites, which orbit at around 36,000 kilometers above Earth, Starlink satellites operate at approximately 550 kilometers, significantly reducing latency and improving connection speed. The system works through thousands of small satellites interconnected by laser beams, transmitting data among themselves and to ground stations. The end user only needs a terminal with an automatic antenna that aligns itself with the moving satellites and transmits the signal to a router, enabling broadband internet access even in isolated locations.

Over time, Starlink’s application expanded far beyond digital inclusion in remote areas. The technology began to play a crucial role in contexts of crisis and conflict. In Ukraine, after the Russian invasion in 2022, Starlink became essential for maintaining military and civilian communications, enabling troop coordination, drone operations, and the functioning of hospitals and emergency services. In countries such as Sudan and Iran, terminals were used amid civil wars and protests against authoritarian regimes, often smuggled in to bypass government internet shutdowns. In Venezuela, the system was used to overcome information blackouts, and in the Gaza Strip it served humanitarian organizations in coordinating medical and logistical aid. These examples show that satellite connectivity has ceased to be merely a technological solution and has become a strategic instrument.

However, this expansion has also brought deep and multidimensional criticism. One of the main concerns relates to the enormous power concentrated in the hands of a private company that controls a critical global infrastructure. In war zones, as occurred in Ukraine, Starlink can become the only functional communication infrastructure, replacing networks that were destroyed or deliberately shut down. In this context, corporate decisions such as activating, limiting, georestricting, or suspending the service cease to be merely commercial and begin to carry direct strategic consequences. A technical alteration in signal coverage can compromise military operations, affect drone coordination, interfere with troop logistics, or influence the outcome of offensives. Furthermore, the mere threat of service interruption can function as an instrument of political pressure. This raises normative questions such as to what extent a private corporation should have the power to influence the course of an armed conflict and who supervises that power. What mechanisms of accountability exist when corporate decisions impact sovereignty, human lives, and international security?

The criticism is not limited to the political sphere. There are also significant environmental concerns. The Starlink constellation involves thousands of satellites in low Earth orbit, with a relatively short lifespan, generally under five years. This implies frequent replacement launches, intensifying the occupation of Earth’s orbit and increasing the risk of collisions and space debris generation. When these satellites reenter the atmosphere, they release particles such as aluminum oxide, whose accumulation may affect the ozone layer and alter atmospheric processes not yet fully understood by science. Added to this is light pollution caused by sunlight reflecting off the satellites, which interferes with astronomical observation and scientific research, and may potentially impact ecosystems and species that depend on natural darkness for their biological cycles. Thus, the expansion of private space infrastructure also raises a debate about orbital sustainability and global environmental governance.

The case of Starlink illustrates how private transnational infrastructures have become central to contemporary geopolitical conflicts. Companies like SpaceX can act as actors with their own interests, autonomous strategies, and real capacity to shape international events. Although they primarily seek profit and market expansion, their decisions frequently incorporate political, strategic, and diplomatic calculations. A company operating globally must consider not only contracts and revenues, but also relations with different governments, regulatory risks, access to markets, and international supply chains. In this scenario, the relationship between state and company is marked by complex interdependence. Governments rely on the technological innovation, operational efficiency, and speed of implementation that private corporations can provide, especially in high-tech sectors such as space. On the other hand, these corporations depend on billion-dollar public contracts, subsidies, regulatory licenses, and institutional stability to operate and expand their businesses. The relationship is not purely hierarchical, in which the state simply commands and the company obeys, but rather dynamic and at times tense. In certain circumstances, the state may pressure or regulate; in others, it may find itself constrained by its own dependence on private infrastructure.

The geopolitical influence of Starlink becomes even more evident when one observes that its actions can significantly strengthen or limit a state’s capacity in a conflict. Connectivity becomes a strategic resource comparable to energy, weapons, trade routes, or financial systems. Controlling flows of information and communication means controlling the ability to coordinate forces, maintain morale, sustain logistical chains, and influence public narratives. In light of this reality, several nations have begun to view dependence on foreign private infrastructures as a strategic vulnerability. The European Union, for example, has invested in its own satellite constellation projects to ensure greater technological autonomy and reduce risks of external dependence. China is developing state-run space communication systems under strong government control, integrating them into its technological sovereignty strategy. Even the United States, the country of origin of SpaceX, seeks to balance cooperation and control by expanding military contracts and strengthening public space programs to avoid excessive dependence on a single commercial provider.

Thus, Starlink’s trajectory reveals a structural change in the international system, in which control over global digital infrastructures has become a central element of contemporary power. The dispute over technological and spatial autonomy indicates that, in the 21st century, sovereignty is not measured solely by territory or military force, but also by the capacity to control the networks that connect the world. Even so, the unfolding consequences of this transformation remain open. It is unclear to what extent states will be able to regain autonomy in the face of highly innovative and financially powerful transnational corporations, nor whether new international regulations will be able to keep pace with the speed of technological change. It is also uncertain whether the growing militarization of space will result in greater global cooperation or a new orbital strategic race. The case of Starlink may be only the beginning of a period in which private infrastructures will redefine, in still unpredictable ways, global balances of power.

References

ABELS, Joscha. Private infrastructure in geopolitical conflicts: the case of Starlink and the war in Ukraine. European Journal of International Relations, v. 30, n. 4, p. 842–866, 2024. Disponível em: <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/13540661241260653#page=13.15>.

LATSCHAN, Thomas. Starlink: How Elon Musk’s company influences geopolitics. dw.com. Disponível em: <https://www.dw.com/en/starlink-how-elon-musks-company-influences-geopolitics/a-75963477>.