12/12/2023 Sputnik/Mikhail Tereschenko/Pool via REUTERS
On March 7, 2024, Sweden officially joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), becoming the bloc's 32nd member and breaking with decades of Swedish policy of neutrality in times of conflict, a tradition that dates back to the Second World War. Napoleonic paintings from the beginning of the 19th century.
The NATO expansion project was cited as one of the justifications that led the Russian Federation to invade Ukrainian territory in early 2022. This invasion, in turn, encouraged Finland and Sweden to join the organization. Finland's formal accession to the bloc took place in April 2023, while Sweden, after a negotiation process of around 22 months marked by obstacles, finalized its entry this year, having faced resistance especially from Turkey and Hungary, both member nations. of NATO.
Expressing discontent with Swedish membership, President Vladimir Putin warned on February 29, 2024, of the risk of a nuclear conflict with the West if NATO decided to send troops to Ukraine. Accusations have also been made against Western countries of trying to drag Russia into a new arms race, similar to that experienced during the Cold War.
In this article, we will examine the reasons why the presence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on the borders of Eastern Europe has caused discomfort on the part of the Russian Federation, as well as analyze some of the strategies adopted by the Russian government to deal with this situation.
What is the role of NATO?
The origin of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is closely linked to the West's relationship with Russia. Founded in 1949, during the turbulent years of the Cold War, the Alliance was conceived with the primary purpose of containing the expansion and political influence of the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in Europe. Its structure is based on the North Atlantic Treaty, which establishes a system of collective defense among its members.
NATO's main objective is to ensure the freedom and security of its members, promoting democratic values and fostering cooperation in security and defense matters. The organization advocates the peaceful resolution of disputes, although it maintains the ability to resort to military power if necessary. In the context of the current conflict between Russia and Ukraine, debates have arisen around Article 5 of the Treaty, which contains the clause of mutual defense between the members of the Alliance.
Read the article below:
“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.” (Article 5, North Atlantic Treaty, 1949)
A common interpretation of this article does not see it as an obligation for all member states to participate in a conflict, but rather as a willingness to act as necessary, which raises doubts about the willingness of all these countries to risk their military forces in a possible dispute.
Strategic concept 2022
The document adopted by (NATO) during the summit meeting in Madrid, entitled “Strategic Concept”, emphatically highlights the defensive character of the Atlantic alliance and its unwavering adherence to the purposes and principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter and the North Atlantic Treaty. This document pays special attention to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, identifying Russia as "the most significant and immediate threat to the security of the allies." Furthermore, it defines the three fundamental elements of its action: deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security.
Among the decisions deliberated during the aforementioned meeting, the highlights are the increase in military forces on standby, especially on the bloc's eastern border; the commitment of each country to allocate at least 2% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to defense expenses by the year 2024; continued military support for Ukraine and a commitment to provide assistance to other partners at risk of conflict, including Bosnia-Herzegovina, Moldova and Georgia; the launch of an Innovation Fund, which will allocate €1 billion over the next 15 years to the development of dual-use technologies; the formal invitation to Sweden and Finland to join the Alliance; and, finally, the reiteration of the "open door" policy for the accession of new members.
The new 2022 Strategic Concept reflects NATO's perception of the existence of persistent threats, such as terrorism, instability, growing strategic competition and the advance of authoritarianism, which directly contradict the Alliance's fundamental interests and values.
And what is the reason for such a context to arouse apprehension on the part of the Russian Federation?
First we will analyze two concepts:
1) Security Dilemma.
This concept explores the dynamics in which States, when seeking to increase their own security through defensive measures, end up inadvertently generating insecurity and tensions between other countries. This occurs in the context of an anarchic international system, characterized by the absence of a central authority that can regulate international interactions.
When a State decides to strengthen its military power with the aim of protecting itself, this action, even if it is perceived as defensive, can be interpreted as a threat by other nations. In response to this perceived threat, other states may feel compelled to increase their own military capabilities as a precautionary measure. This cycle of increasing military power creates an environment of mutual distrust, leading to an arms spiral in which everyone involved feels less safe, despite individual efforts to ensure their own protection.
The dilemma therefore illustrates the inherent difficulty of achieving security in an international system in which the intentions and actions of other states are uncertain, and where the individual search for security can inadvertently lead to a general increase in insecurity and tensions geopolitics.
2) Balance of power.
The concept of 'equilibrium', seen as a synonym for 'balance', (...) means stability within a system composed of a variety of autonomous forces (MORGENTHAU, 2003, p.322).
The balance of power is a state of balance in which no State or coalition of States has absolute predominance over the others, which promotes an international system characterized by controlled competition and the prevention of hegemony. This balance plays a crucial role in maintaining international peace and stability, as it prevents the accumulation of power by a single entity from resulting in a unipolar system, which tends to be less stable and more prone to conflict.
The Russian perception
The Russian government perceives the expansion of NATO in the post-Cold War period as a threat to the country's security, interpreting it as a strategy to encircle it geopolitically and unbalance the order of power in the region.
Sergey Lavrov, Russia's Foreign Minister, employs the "security dilemma" argument, which suggests that a state cannot strengthen its own security without compromising the security of others. He also accuses the signatory countries of not adhering to the "Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security", signed in 1994 during the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) summit in Budapest. Lavrov argues that the interpretation of the Code is selective and aims to promote an "irresponsible" expansion of NATO.
Read article 3 of the Code:
"They remain convinced that security is indivisible and that the security of each of them is inseparably linked to the security of all others. They will not strengthen their security at the expense of the security of other States. [...]" (article 3, OSCE, 1994).
The expansion of NATO's presence in Eastern Europe has raised concerns regarding Russian security, especially due to the proximity of military forces from Western countries. As previously highlighted, the formation of the military Alliance occurred during the Cold War. However, in recent years NATO has increasingly advanced towards Russian borders in a different geopolitical context (LUIS; LEITE, 2023). The Kremlin interprets this NATO expansion in Eastern Europe as a demonstration of hostility on the part of the West towards Russia. Such a move is also considered by Moscow as a violation of Russian sovereignty and territorial integrity, and this argument is used for internal political purposes.
Rally ‘Round the Flag Effect
“The ‘rally’ effect is the public’s propensity to set aside political differences and support the president during international crises.” (D. Baker; R. Oneal, 2001).
A state leader's speech that portrays an imminent threat or the idea of a common enemy to the nation can incite an increase in nationalist fervor and societal cohesion around that leader. This phenomenon is illustrated by Ferraro (2022), a specialist in Political Science at the Moscow Higher School of Economics, who observed that Vladimir Putin experienced peaks in popularity in times of conflict, such as in the years 2000, 2008, 2014 and more recently, during the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.
According to data from the Levada Center, an independent and non-governmental organization in Russia, Putin's approval rating reached 86 percentage points in February 2024.
Data from Levada Center Institute
Another strategy used in the domestic sphere is the use of euphemisms. These aim to mitigate the severity of negative social phenomena, inhumane policies and aggressive military actions (SPIŠIAKOVÁ; SHUMEIKO, 2023). A recent example is the current Russian-Ukrainian conflict: while the international community characterizes it as a "war", the Russian government describes it as a "special military operation", which influences the discourse within the country. Some media outlets have been fined and censored by Roskomnadzor (Federal Communications Supervision Service) for using the expression "war".
Mária Spišiaková (2023), an expert in linguistics and economic language at the University of Economics in Bratislava, Slovakia, addresses this topic in her article "Political Euphemisms and Neologisms in Online Media: Amid the War in Ukraine". She analyzes how the use of specific terms influences the way people perceive events, distorting reality: the term "special military operation" obscures the true nature of Russian actions, which are military aggression against another country.
A third way to attract public opinion in your favor is through nationalist discourse. A method that it also employs in its foreign policy. The president, in his first speech announcing the invasion of Ukraine, said:
"I would like to emphasize once again that Ukraine is not just a neighboring country for us. It is an inalienable part of our own history, culture and spiritual space. These are our comrades, those who are dearest to us – not just colleagues, friends and people who once served together, but also relatives, people linked by blood, by family ties" (PUTIN, 2022, our translation).
In another part of the speech, he stated:
"Modern Ukraine was created entirely by Russia, or, to be more precise, by Bolshevik, Communist Russia. This process began almost immediately after the revolution of 1917, and Lenin and his associates did it in a way that was extremely harsh for Russia – separating and cutting off what is historically Russian land. No one asked the millions of people who lived there what they thought" (PUTIN, 2022, our translation).
Putin adopts a perspective that does not recognize Ukrainian ethno-national identity, considering it as a historically integral part of Russia, whose separation is seen as a result of manipulations during the Soviet period, blaming the Communist Party of the USSR for seeking to please nationalists:
"Why was it necessary to appease the nationalists, to satisfy the incessantly growing nationalist ambitions on the outskirts of the former empire? (...) Let me repeat that these territories were transferred together with the population of what was historically Russia" (PUTIN, 2022, our translation).
Russian World
Currently, NATO is pointed out by the Russian government as the guilty agent in this situation. In his article titled "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians", President Putin argues that Ukraine has been drawn into a dangerous geopolitical game, the aim of which was to turn it into a barrier between Europe and Russia. Putin accuses the Ukrainian government of being illegitimate, claiming it is a puppet regime under Western control, and claims that this situation threatens the survival of the Russian state.
Several scholars argue that the Putin government's foreign policy agenda is aimed at preserving the "Russkiy Mir" (Russian World). Although this term has been interpreted in various ways over the decades, Meienberger (2023), PhD in Organizational Studies and Cultural Theory from the University of St. Gallen, clarifies that it refers to the valorization and preservation of Russian culture, with Russian geopolitical interests occupying the core of this concept.
“The Russian language not only preserves a whole layer of truly global achievements, but is also the living space for many millions of people in the Russian-speaking world, a community that goes far beyond Russia itself. As a common heritage of many peoples, the Russian language will never become the language of hatred or enmity, xenophobia or isolationism. In my opinion, we need to support the initiative put forward by Russian linguists to create a National Russian Language Foundation, the main goal of which will be to develop the Russian language in the country, support Russian language study programs abroad and promote the Russian language and literature throughout the world" (Putin in a speech to the Assembly, 2007, our translation).
"Russkiy Mir" is considered a soft power tool of Russia. According to Meister (2016), for Russian leaders, soft power is not limited to the "attraction" interpretation proposed by Nye, but refers to the use of non-military instruments to manipulate, undermine and weaken opponents, complementing military power from Moscow. In 2012, Putin himself defined the concept as "a set of tools and methods for achieving foreign policy goals without the use of weapons, but through information and other levers of influence." He also accused pseudo-NGOs of using this tool with the purpose of fomenting extremism, separatism, nationalism, with the aim of manipulating public consciousness and directly interfering in the internal politics of sovereign states (PUTIN, 2012).
As a way to combat these NGOs, in June 2007, President Putin issued a decree establishing the Russkiy Mir Foundation, linked to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education and Science, with the purpose of promoting the Russian language as a national heritage. The Russkiy Mir Foundation aims to support the study of the Russian language among native and non-native speakers, both domestically and abroad. Its activities include funding scholarships, producing educational materials, sponsoring language courses, competitions, cultural programs, and supporting Russian arts and culture on a global scale (Russkiymir, 2007).
Russkiy Mir plays an influential role especially in the context of Ukraine. In 2014, during a speech in the Kremlin, Putin justified the annexation of the Crimean peninsula as a measure to "protect the Russian-speaking population from the unstable Ukrainian government". He denounced the Ukrainian government for depriving Russians living in the region of their historical memory and even their language, as well as subjecting them to forced assimilation. Putin also accused Euromaidan organizers of being nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-semites. In March 2023, when justifying the invasion of Ukrainian territory, the president argued that he was fighting for the Russian world in Ukraine, and that his objective was not to seek a geopolitical position, but rather to guarantee the existence of the Russian state.
Conclusion
Given the current geopolitical panorama, the resurgence of tensions between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) emerges as a challenge of great magnitude for stability and security in Europe. The adoption of nationalist rhetoric and the implementation of hard and soft power strategies by Russia denote a clear attempt to safeguard its influence in the region and to assert itself as a relevant geopolitical protagonist, especially given the growing presence of NATO in its borders. However, these same tactics contribute to intensifying the climate of distrust and hostility, increasing the risk of conflicts and instability in the region.
Therefore, it is imperative to prioritize the search for diplomatic solutions and promote constructive dialogue between all parties involved. The implementation of measures aimed at cooling tensions and building an atmosphere of mutual trust is essential to avoid a possible escalation of the conflict and to foster peace and stability in Europe. However, given the complexity of the interests and narratives at stake, the question arises about the concrete viability of these initiatives.
The discussion around this topic is extensive and multifaceted, involving a diversity of motivations and narratives. It is well known that States often claim respect for the principle of state sovereignty in certain contexts, however, contradictorily, they openly violate it when such an attitude suits them. In this context, a genuine commitment to international cooperation and the search for solutions that favor dialogue and negotiation, to the detriment of unilateral and belligerent approaches, is essential, aiming to ensure peace and security across the entire European region.
Bibliographic references
BEAUCHAMP, Z. Why is Putin attacking Ukraine? He told us. Vox, 23 fev. 2022.
D. BAKER, William; R. ONEAL, John. Patriotism or Opinion Leadership?: The Nature and Origins of the "Rally 'Round the Flag" Effect. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, v. 45, n. 5, p. 661-687, 2001. Disponível em: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3176318.
DUARTE, S. O novo conceito estratégico da OTAN. Disponível em: <http://ila-brasil.org.br/blog/o-novo-conceito-estrategico-da-otan/#:~:text=O%20novo%20Conceito%20Estrat%C3%A9gico%202022>.
FERRARO, V. O que está por trás da crise entre a Rússia, Ucrânia e Otan? Poder360, 2022. Disponível em: <https://www.poder360.com.br/opiniao/o-que-esta-por-tras-da-crise-entre-a-russia-ucrania-e-otan/>.
KRASTEV, I. “Sovereign Democracy”, Russian-Style. Insight Turkey, v. 8, n. 4, p. pp. 113-117, 2006.
LARUELLE, M. The “Russian World” - Russia’s Soft Power and Geopolitical Imagination. [s.l.] CGI Center on Global Interests, 2015.
LAVROV, S. V. Message on Indivisibility of Security., 2022. Disponível em: <https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1796679/>
LEVADA CENTER. Indicators. Disponível em: <https://www.levada.ru/en/ratings/>.
LUIS, E.; LEITE, L. Uma análise da resposta do ocidente à invasão russa da Ucrânia sob o prisma da trindade da Guerra de Clausewitz. Revista da Escola de Guerra Naval, v. 29, n. 1, p. 1–22, 1 jan. 2023.
MEIENBERGER, A. The Concept of the “Russkiy Mir”: History of the Concept and Ukraine. University of St. Gallen. Euxeinos, v. 13, n. 35, p. 15–29, 1 out. 2023.
MEISTER, S. 4 Putin’s Version of Soft Power. Isolation and Propaganda: The Roots and Instruments of Russia’s Disinformation Campaign, p.7-11. 2016.
MORGENTHAU, H. J. A política entre as nações : a luta pelo poder e pela paz. Brasília: Editora Universidade De Brasília, 2003.
NATO. NATO 2022 Strategic Concept. In: NATO SUMMIT. 2022.
OSCE. Code of conduct on politico-military aspects of security. In: 91ST PLENARY MEETING OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE CSCE FORUM FOR SECURITY CO-OPERATION. OSCE Secretariat Department for Conference Services, 21 dez. 1994. Disponível em: <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/5/7/41355.pdf>
OSCE. Istanbul Document 1999. In: 6TH ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE. OSCE Secretariat Department for Conference Services, jan. 2000. Disponível em: <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/6/5/39569.pdf>
OTAN. Tratado do Atlântico Norte. 4 abr. 1949. Disponível em: <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm?selectedLocale=pt>
PUTIN, V. V. Россия и меняющийся мир. 2012. Disponível em: <https://www.mn.ru/politics/78738>.
PUTIN, V. V. Address by President of the Russian Federation. Moscow, 2014. Disponível em: <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603>
PUTIN, V. V. On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians. 2021.
PUTIN, V. V. Address by the President of the Russian Federation. Moscow, 21 fev. 2022. Disponível em: <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67828>
Russkiymir. 2007. Disponível em: <https://russkiymir.ru/en/>.
SNYDER, G. H. The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics. World Politics, v. 36, n. 4, p. 461–495, jul. 1984.
S. NYE, JR., J. Public Diplomacy and Soft Power. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, v. 616, p. 94–109. Sage Publications, Inc., mar. 2008.
SPIŠIAKOVÁ, M.; SHUMEIKO, N. Political Euphemisms and Neologisms in Online Media Content: Amid the War in Ukraine. University of Economics Bratislava - Department of Romance and Slavic Languages, 2023.
TACC. Путин заявил, что Россия на Украине борется за Русский мир. Disponível em: <https://tass.ru/politika/17261539>.
TIMES, Р. СЛУЖБА T. M. Роскомнадзор запретил российским СМИ называть войну в Украине войной. Disponível em: <https://www.moscowtimes.ru/2022/02/26/roskomnadzor-zapretil-rossiiskim-smi-nazivat-voinu-v-ukraine-voinoi-a18160>. Acesso em: 19 mar. 2024.
WALT, S. M. NATO Should Not Accept Ukraine—for Ukraine’s Sake. Disponível em: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/03/05/nato-ukraine-membership-russia-war-west/>.
Comments