Russia in Africa: sovereignty, security, and dispute

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Putin and participants at the Russia-Africa summit pose for a photo in St. Petersburg, Russia, 2023. (Photo: Getty Images)

In recent decades, Africa has consolidated itself as a central arena of geopolitical dispute within the international system. The progressive erosion of the liberal order and the emergence of a multipolar configuration have expanded the continent’s prominence, both as a collective actor through the African Union and as a set of states with growing strategic room for maneuver. In this context, Russia has intensified its political, economic, and security presence in Africa, presenting itself as an alternative partner to the West and a defender of African sovereignty.

Russia’s engagement combines instruments of hard power, soft power, and hybrid strategies, articulated through an anti-colonial discourse of non-intervention and respect for the sovereign choices of African states. At the same time, this presence has been criticized by Western countries and international organizations, which point to risks associated with militarization, information manipulation, and human rights violations. This analysis examines Russia’s presence in Africa through these dimensions, addressing rivalry with the West, similarities with the Chinese approach, and the institutional framework provided by Agenda 2063 and the Russia–African Union Action Plan 2023–2026.

Hard power and security: influence through armed stability

The security axis constitutes one of the central pillars of Russian influence in Africa. Moscow has expanded military cooperation with several African countries, especially in regions marked by chronic instability, such as the Sahel, Central Africa, and parts of the Horn of Africa. This cooperation includes arms sales, training of national forces, defense advisory services, and, in some cases, the presence of indirect military structures, such as the Wagner Group, later reorganized under the Africa Corps.

From the Russian perspective, this engagement responds to legitimate demands from African states facing terrorism, armed insurgencies, and institutional fragility, in line with the principle of “African solutions to African problems.” For Western critics, however, this presence is associated with the support of authoritarian regimes, the exchange of security for access to natural resources, and the aggravation of violent dynamics, as in Mali.

Thus, Russian hard power in Africa is not limited to the direct use of force but operates as an instrument of political bargaining and strategic repositioning in contexts where Western presence has lost legitimacy or effectiveness.

Soft power: anti-colonial narrative and sovereignty

Alongside the military axis, Russia mobilizes a sophisticated discursive soft power, anchored in the historical memory of Soviet support for African liberation struggles and in criticism of European colonialism. Moscow builds its image as a partner that respects sovereignty, rejects political conditionalities, and does not interfere in the internal affairs of states.

This narrative resonates directly with documents and principles valued by the African Union, such as Agenda 2063, which emphasizes strategic autonomy, endogenous development, and African protagonism in the international system. By supporting African demands for greater representation in global forums, such as the UN Security Council, Russia reinforces its image as a political ally of the continent.

However, this soft power is often accompanied by informational and strategic communication campaigns, including the use of local media and social networks to promote anti-Western discourses, such as anti-French propaganda in the Central African Republic, for example. For the West, these practices constitute information manipulation; for Moscow and its African partners, they represent legitimate narrative disputes in an asymmetric international environment.

Economy, energy, and sovereignty

The economic dimension of Russia’s presence in Africa occupies an intermediate space between soft and hard power. Projects in strategic areas such as nuclear energy, oil and gas, mining, fertilizers, and food security are presented as direct contributions to African economic and technological sovereignty. Examples include the El Dabaa nuclear power plant in Egypt and initiatives aimed at food self-sufficiency in line with African Union commitments, such as the Kampala Declaration.

Russian discourse emphasizes technology transfer, local value creation, and rejection of purely extractivist models. However, Western analysts question the extent to which these projects promote sustainable development or reproduce new forms of dependency, especially when linked to security agreements or strategic resource concessions.

The geopolitical rivalry between Russia and the West in Africa should be understood as a structural dispute involving not only material interests but, above all, models of international order, political legitimacy, and control of narratives. For Moscow, the African continent has become a privileged space to contest Western normative and institutional hegemony, projecting an alternative vision of global governance based on state sovereignty, civilizational pluralism, and the rejection of externally imposed universal standards. From the Russian perspective, Western powers continue to operate according to a neocolonial logic, albeit under new guises. The core criticism focuses on the selective use of the discourse of human rights and democracy as instruments of political pressure, as well as on the application of economic and diplomatic sanctions that, according to Moscow, disproportionately affect developing countries and limit their sovereign foreign policy options. Within this framework, Russia seeks to present itself to African partners as a power that does not condition cooperation on internal political reforms nor demand ideological alignment, reinforcing the idea of partnership among equals.

This narrative gains strength in contexts where Western engagement has been associated with failed military interventions, financial dependency, or the persistence of economic asymmetries. In countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, and the Central African Republic, the withdrawal or weakening of French and European presence has opened space for Russia to position itself as a pragmatic alternative in security matters, exploiting the erosion of Western legitimacy among segments of the population and local political elites. This dispute reveals that Africa is not merely a peripheral stage but a central arena of systemic competition, where different conceptions of international legitimacy confront one another: on one side, the liberal-normative vision of the West; on the other, the sovereignist and pluralist vision defended by Moscow.

In this context, Russia discursively aligns itself with China, particularly in the defense of multipolarity, non-intervention, and the right of states to choose their own development paths. Both reject explicit political conditionalities and criticize the universalization of Western values. However, this convergence should not obscure relevant differences in their modes of engagement.

China has built its presence in Africa primarily through economic and infrastructural instruments, such as financing, trade, and the construction of ports, roads, railways, and industrial zones, integrating the continent into global value chains associated with the Belt and Road Initiative. Its soft power is strongly anchored in a technocratic logic of development, economic growth, and modernization. Russia, by contrast, operates in a more selective and politicized manner, prioritizing strategic sectors such as security, energy, mining, and multilateral diplomacy. Its influence tends to be less based on economic volume and more on geopolitical leverage, giving its presence a more ideological and securitized character. While Beijing seeks predictability and stability to protect long-term investments, Moscow frequently inserts itself into contexts of crisis, institutional fragility, and conflict, where its capacity to offer immediate security support becomes a differentiating factor. Thus, although Russia and China share a convergent discourse on sovereignty and multipolarity, their strategies in Africa reflect distinct power profiles.

Conclusion

Russia’s presence in Africa reflects both transformations in the international system and African strategies of partnership diversification. By combining hard power and soft power, Moscow has managed to expand its influence in regions where the West faces crises of legitimacy and effectiveness. Its anti-colonial discourse, respect for sovereignty, and support for African development agendas resonate across multiple national and regional contexts.

Nevertheless, this engagement is not free of ambiguities and risks. Accusations of human rights violations, information manipulation, and security dependency raise questions about the long-term sustainability of the Russian model of engagement. For African states, the central challenge remains transforming competition among great powers, Russia, China, and the West, into concrete gains in development, security, and autonomy, in line with the objectives of Agenda 2063. Thus, Russia’s presence in Africa reveals a scenario of expanded African agency, in which the continent ceases to be a mere object of geopolitical dispute and asserts itself as an active actor in an increasingly multipolar world.

References

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