How ASEAN is responding to the New World Order

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59th ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting (Plenary Session) in Pasay City, July 21, 2026. (Photo: Government of the Philippines)

This article was originally produced for the Center for International Relations Studies and published on its platform. The version below reproduces the text in full for dissemination purposes.

The ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting took place in the Philippines this July, offering a clear picture of how ASEAN is responding to the new world order. The gathering occurred at a time when the bloc is facing simultaneous pressures from the rivalry between the United States and China, Russia’s growing engagement with the region, the economic impacts of the war involving Iran, and tensions in the South China Sea. Rather than choosing sides, ASEAN seeks to strengthen its own institutional architecture and expand its capacity to coordinate the region.

In this context, concerns over geoeconomic fragmentation repeatedly emerged throughout the ministers' speeches and the Joint Communiqué. Despite ASEAN's 4.9% economic growth in 2025 and the projected 4.6% expansion in 2026, the ministers acknowledged that the conflict in the Middle East, rising tariffs, the fragmentation of global supply chains, and the deterioration of the international environment pose concrete risks to Southeast Asia's economic stability. The document explicitly highlights the possibility of disruptions to critical energy routes, rising food prices, inflationary pressures, and impacts on regional trade, calling for a coordinated response among member states to preserve the bloc's economic resilience.

These concerns help explain why ASEAN has accelerated virtually all of its major strategic initiatives at the same time. The Joint Communiqué welcomes the upgrade of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA 3.0), progress in negotiations with Canada, the review of the trade agreement with India, the modernization of the agreement with South Korea, the strengthening of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and closer economic ties with the Gulf Cooperation Council. This strategy seeks to reduce vulnerabilities in an increasingly polarized international system while safeguarding access to markets, investment, and supply chains. The development of regional standards for digital identity, electronic payments, artificial intelligence, and cybersecurity, together with the creation of the region's first shared high-performance computing infrastructure for AI and the future ASEAN AI SAFE network, demonstrates the bloc's intention to build its own capabilities in strategic sectors while reducing external technological dependence.

In the energy sector, as the war involving Iran threatened major maritime supply routes, ASEAN reaffirmed its commitment to the ASEAN Power Grid and to new regional energy security mechanisms designed to respond to potential disruptions in oil and gas supplies. These initiatives are intended to mitigate geopolitical risks.

Between Washington, Beijing, and Moscow

Manila became one of the main diplomatic hubs of the Indo-Pacific, hosting representatives of the world's major powers amid growing strategic rivalry between the United States and China. The simultaneous presence of U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov demonstrated that competition for influence in Southeast Asia remains intense and is likely to deepen in the coming years.

The United States' position during the meeting reinforced this dynamic. Washington once again defended freedom of navigation, respect for international law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), while reaffirming its commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific. Although these principles are shared by ASEAN, the bloc has sought to avoid allowing its agenda to become an instrument of strategic competition among the major powers. The ministerial communiqué repeatedly reaffirms ASEAN centrality, respect for consensus, and the pursuit of a rules-based regional order, preserving room for dialogue with both the United States and China.

This cautious approach must also be understood in light of the Philippine chairmanship. Manila assumed ASEAN's leadership at a particularly delicate moment. Externally, it continues to face recurring tensions with Beijing in the South China Sea while deepening its defense cooperation with the United States. Domestically, the Philippines is experiencing a period of heightened political polarization, making it even more challenging to lead an organization whose defining characteristic remains the pursuit of consensus among countries with often divergent strategic interests.

It is within this context that the new TAC guidelines assume greater significance. The mechanism expands opportunities for cooperation between ASEAN and countries that have acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation but have not yet established a formal partnership with the bloc. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iran, Argentina, Bangladesh, Egypt, Serbia, Ukraine, and other signatories will now have access to an institutional channel through which they can submit projects aligned with ASEAN's own priorities while respecting the principles of the treaty. These initiatives remain voluntary, require approval by ASEAN's institutions, and do not alter the political status of participating countries within the organization, thereby preserving the bloc's decision-making autonomy.

In an environment of growing geopolitical and geoeconomic fragmentation, ASEAN is seeking to expand its capacity for international engagement without compromising the balance that underpins its diplomacy. By creating opportunities for project-based cooperation with countries from different regions, many of which hold conflicting positions or are directly involved in international disputes, the bloc reinforces its role as a platform for dialogue and cooperation, reducing the need to categorize its partners according to rigid political alignments.

For Brazil, these developments deserve close attention. Although the country is not yet a formal ASEAN partner, it is a signatory to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, a status that now opens new avenues for institutional engagement. In practical terms, Brasília will be able to propose projects in areas of mutual interest without having to negotiate a comprehensive strategic partnership, a process that is typically longer and more complex. Sectors such as bioenergy, tropical agriculture, food security, infrastructure, digital transformation, critical minerals, energy transition, and scientific cooperation present significant potential for convergence with ASEAN's priorities for the coming decade. At a time when the Brazilian government seeks to diversify its economic partnerships, expand its presence in the Indo-Pacific, and strengthen its engagement with the Global South, the new mechanism offers a concrete opportunity to deepen relations with a region expected to account for a substantial share of global economic growth in the decades ahead. The guidelines broaden the diplomatic options available to countries seeking to build a long-term cooperation agenda with ASEAN while preserving the flexibility that has long characterized the bloc's foreign policy.