Brazil’s Green Paradox on the Eve of COP 30
- Paula Lazzari
- 6 days ago
- 5 min read
Note: The views expressed in this text are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of this website.
As the global climate agenda gains centrality, Brazil seeks to reposition itself as a heavyweight actor in international negotiations. The hosting of COP 30 in Belém symbolizes the country’s effort to reaffirm its leadership in environmental diplomacy and consolidate an image as a green power. The choice of the Amazon as the venue for the main global environmental forum reinforces the narrative that the country is the guardian of biodiversity of planetary relevance and, therefore, an indispensable actor in international climate governance. However, recent domestic decisions reveal deep tensions between discourse and practice.
The authorization granted by Ibama, in October 2025, for exploratory drilling of an oil well at the mouth of the Amazon clearly exposed this contradiction. The same agency had denied the request two years earlier, citing technical flaws and the absence of regional planning instruments. The reversal of the decision, amid preparations for the climate conference, became a symbol of the dilemma that marks Brazilian environmental policy: reconciling the pursuit of international recognition with internal pressures for energy security and economic development.
The Equatorial Margin case is not merely a conflict between conservation and exploitation. It expresses a broader process of institutional transformation, in which environmental licensing has shifted from an instrument of precaution to a mechanism of risk management. This inflection reflects an attempt to balance heterogeneous agendas without breaking the narrative of climate commitment. The result is a system that formally preserves precaution but, in practice, operates under a logic of mitigation and control.
Institutional Reconfiguration and Risk Management
The decision-making process that led to the drilling authorization illustrates the change in Ibama’s role within Brazil’s regulatory structure. In 2023, the agency rejected Petrobras’s request due to the absence of a Sedimentary Area Environmental Assessment, gaps in oil dispersion modeling, and deficiencies in emergency plans. Two years later, after revising protocols, adding conditions, and expanding remote monitoring, the request was reconsidered. Although limited to the exploratory stage, the new license marked an institutional turning point: licensing ceased to be an exercise of technical veto and became a negotiation arena among governmental sectors.
This reconfiguration reflects a broader logic of environmental governance based on risk administration. Brazilian environmental policy, historically anchored in precaution, has begun to operate under the assumption that uncertainties can be managed through technological controls and regulatory conditions. The Ministry of Mines and Energy began to present the Equatorial Margin as a strategic frontier for energy security and national autonomy, arguing that future revenues could finance the transition to a low-carbon economy. However, the instruments that would ensure such allocation remain fragile and fragmented.
It is in this context that Brazilian authorities often invoke the example of Norway to argue that hydrocarbon exploration can coexist with ambitious climate goals. The parallel, however, reveals more contrasts than similarities. The Norwegian experience relies on solid institutions, a sovereign fund overseen by Parliament, and a lasting political consensus on energy transition. The Scandinavian country combines regulatory transparency, low fiscal dependence on oil, and a carbon neutrality plan for 2050. Brazilian conditions are different: the country lacks equivalent accountability mechanisms, regulatory predictability, and a consolidated stabilization fund. While Norway manages its oil production as part of an ongoing transition, Brazil still uses it as a promise of a future transition. The contrast highlights differing degrees of institutionalization and historical trajectories in building an environmental state.
Climate Leadership and International Credibility
The coincidence between the drilling authorization and the preparations for COP 30 amplified the symbolic impact of the decision. The event was conceived as a showcase for Brazil’s return to climate diplomacy and the recovery of its global coordination capacity. However, the opening of a new oil front in the same region as the conference raised questions about the coherence of the official discourse. Environmental organizations, research centers, and parts of the international press interpreted the measure as a sign of strategic ambiguity. The government responded that the licensing does not compromise emission targets and that the country has the technical capacity to reconcile exploration with environmental responsibility.
This response echoes a tradition in Brazilian foreign policy: balancing normative leadership with economic pragmatism. Since Rio-92, Brazil has sought to assert itself as a mediator between the global North and South, upholding the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. This position grants international legitimacy but demands consistency between multilateral commitments and domestic policies. When internal decisions challenge this coherence, external credibility is weakened.
Environmental leadership is not built by diplomacy alone. It depends on the institutional capacity to translate international commitments into predictable and transparent public policies. The country’s credibility rests less on declarations of intent and more on the stability of mechanisms that regulate the use of its natural resources. The Equatorial Margin case shows that Brazil’s challenge is to govern the energy transition without compromising the integrity of its environmental policy.
COP 30 will offer a decisive test. Brazil arrives at the conference with a predominantly renewable electricity matrix, leadership in clean energy, and extensive experience in climate negotiations. These assets, however, must be accompanied by institutional coherence and regulatory transparency. If the licensing at the mouth of the Amazon is perceived as part of a planned transition, it may reinforce the image of a mature Brazilian state. Otherwise, it will confirm the persistence of a paradox: that of a country claiming green leadership while reconfiguring its environmental institutions to accommodate oil expansion.
Consolidating this leadership will require more than the rhetoric of reconciling production and protection. It will mean building a governance system that integrates sustainability, predictability, and public accountability. Brazil’s green paradox lies not only in the coexistence of exploration and conservation but in the distance between the diplomatic ambition to lead and the institutional capacity to sustain that leadership with coherence and credibility.
References
IBAMA. Despacho nº 15786950/2023-Gabin – Decisão sobre pedido de licença para perfuração no bloco FZA-M-59, Bacia da Foz do Amazonas. Brasília, 17 mai. 2023. Disponível em: https://www.gov.br/ibama/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/2023/ibama-nega-licenca-de-perfuracao-na-bacia-da-foz-do-amazonas/sei_ibama-15786950-despacho-presidente.pdf
IBAMA. Nota do Ministério do Meio Ambiente e Mudança do Clima (MMA) sobre o indeferimento de licença para perfuração no bloco FZA-M-59, Bacia da Foz do Amazonas. Brasília, 19 mai. 2023. Disponível em: https://www.gov.br/ibama/pt-br/assuntos/notas/2023/nota-do-mma-sobre-o-indeferimento-de-licenca-para-perfuracao-no-bloco-fza-m-59-na-bacia-da-foz-do-amazonas
IBAMA. Processo de licenciamento ambiental para perfuração marítima no bloco FZA-M-59 – ofício ao empreendedor com solicitações de complementação. Brasília, 29 out. 2024. Disponível em: https://www.gov.br/ibama/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/2024/processo-de-licenciamento-ambiental-para-perfuracao-maritima-no-bloco-fza-m-59
MINISTÉRIO DE MINAS E ENERGIA (MME). Aprovação de simulado de exploração de petróleo na Margem Equatorial é passo fundamental para a soberania energética do Brasil, afirma Silveira. Brasília, 25 set. 2025. Disponível em: https://www.gov.br/mme/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/aprovacao-de-simulado-de-exploracao-de-petroleo-na-margem-equatorial-e-passo-fundamental-para-a-soberania-energetica-do-brasil-afirma-silveira
MINISTÉRIO DE MINAS E ENERGIA (MME). Silveira comemora liberação de licença para exploração do poço FZA-M-59 na Margem Equatorial. Brasília, 20 out. 2025. Disponível em: https://www.gov.br/mme/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/silveira-comemora-liberacao-de-licenca-para-exploracao-do-poco-fza-m-59-na-margem-equatorial
IBAMA. Nota à imprensa – Bloco FZA-M-59, Bacia da Foz do Amazonas. Brasília, 20 out. 2025. Disponível em: https://www.gov.br/ibama/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/2025/nota-a-imprensa-bloco-fza-m-59-bacia-da-foz-do-amazonas
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