Administrative reform - what is at stake?

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National Congress, Brasília. Photo: José Paulo Lacerda | CNI Agency

The debate about the Administrative Reform has gained increasing prominence in recent days in the National Congress, and it is necessary to highlight some initial points for a full understanding of what is at stake in the national political scenario.

Unlike the private sector, public agencies have limitations on what and how they can perform certain acts, so they depend essentially on legal provision to act. Thus, the public administration depends on the prior existence of a rule authorizing its action, whether in the 1988 Constitution, in Ordinary and Complementary Laws, in Decrees, Regulations, or Internal Rules. Administrative Reform is nothing more than the alteration of some rules of management and performance of public servants, adjusting operational and administrative parameters in the public sphere.

It is important to note that the Reform that is about to be brought up for discussion in the National Congress is not the first and, very likely, will not be the last to occur in Brazil, because it is part of a natural and necessary process so that the Public Administration can be improved and begin to meet social demands more effectively. However, the Brazilian experience with previous reforms showed limited results and implementation difficulties.

Public Administration in Brazil has historically been linked to disorganization, patrimonialist practices (confusion between public and private interest), and bureaucratic practices (slow, delayed, redundant procedures), harming principles of citizenship, public service, and the Democratic State of Law, such as transparency and efficiency.

Laws and decrees institutionalized rules and models of organization of the Public Administration with the aim of modernizing it and adapting it to the needs of the population. Starting with the patrimonialist model, which prevailed during the entire colonial period; the bureaucratic, extensively criticized for low professionalization of entities and for centralizing important decision‑making in a single public agent (thus slower, less accessible, and often of poor quality); and, finally, the managerial model, adopted and implemented between the 1990s and 2000s, sought to implement a model so that administrative acts would be more rational, less costly, less slow, and easily monitored by citizens during and after service delivery. However, none of these models was entirely successful in their practical implementation, whether due to political, cultural factors or lack of technology resources at the time they occurred.

Since the implementation of the Managerial Model in the Federal Government, some positions and agencies were reduced with the goal of “slimming down” public spending, that is, reducing administrative costs to invest more in other portfolios, such as infrastructure or national social programs. However, the total number of civil servants increased from 5.1 million to 11.4 million between 1986 and 2017, representing a jump of 123% in the period, or 2.5% per year (Lopez and Teles, 2021). With the increase in positions also comes increases and adjustments in salaries, benefits, and career advantages that today represent just over 16.9% of the Federal Government’s expenses, behind only Social Security, corresponding to 43.3%, which is indirectly linked to personnel management and the payroll (National Treasury, 2025).

The debate about the quantity, or even the necessity, of public positions to meet social demands is better conducted by specialists in workforce dimensioning, the area responsible for identifying processes, workflows, and techniques to better allocate agents in needed areas. It is worth remembering that Brazil is among the ten largest countries in the world in territory and also in population, and yet the proportion of public servants relative to the population is 12.5%, below the average of 21.1% among OECD countries. Countries like Norway (more than 30%) and the United States (15.4%) have higher rates than Brazil (OECD, 2018).

The Rapporteur 1 of the Administrative Reform Working Group, Deputy Pedro Paulo (PSD‑RJ), presented a Constitutional Amendment Bill, the only way to amend the constitutional text, a Bill, and a Complementary Bill to the Chamber of Deputies. The full texts and draft‑bills are not yet available for public consultation, but the Deputy has already disclosed some points of interest in recent interviews.

In summary, there are proposals to reform the public service aimed at making stability more flexible, changing remuneration criteria and limits, simplifying public careers, and creating other forms and bonds of employment with the public administration. For those who took public examinations in the last 20 years, all these topics are well established in the constitutional study. However, when the Chamber of Deputies proposes to discuss and vote an Administrative Reform, we must understand, in fact, which rule or rules the parliamentarians want to change and, even more importantly, why the changes.

Stability

Stability is the protection that prevents tenured civil servants from being arbitrarily dismissed after the probationary period has been completed. It was created to avoid that public service becomes hostage to political pressures or personal interests of managers, guaranteeing impartiality and continuity in public administration. The current reform proposal intends to flexibilize or even eliminate this guarantee. For its defenders, this would help combat complacency and facilitate removal for underperformance. Critics warn that the change would open space for political persecution and corruption practices, weakening the performance of public service.

Employment bonds and hiring modalities

Public administration in Brazil can hire civil servants in different forms, with the public exam being the most common and transparent, ensuring selection by merit and specific tests. There are also temporary hires, used in emergency situations, and simplified selection processes, which allow quicker choices for short‑term demands, but without stability. Then there are trust positions and broad recruitment, usually by appointment, for managerial, coordination, and advisory roles, raising concerns about the political use of this type of hiring. Currently, the country counts on about 7.5 million public servants across the Union, States, and Municipalities, and the Administrative Reform intends to discuss changes in this hiring model.

Remuneration and supersalaries

A point that deserves great attention in the Brazilian political and administrative landscape is supersalaries. Under the terms of item XI of article 37, no holder of a public office or elective position (from election) may receive a salary higher than that of a Supreme Federal Court (STF) Minister, with the maximum value being R$ 46,366.19.

XI – the remuneration and subsidies of holders of public offices, functions, and public jobs of direct, autarchic, and foundational administration, of members of any branch of government of the Union, of States, of the Federal District, and of Municipalities, of holders of elective office and other political agents, and the annuities, pensions or other remunerative species, perceived cumulatively or not, including personal advantages of any nature, may not exceed the monthly subsidy, in cash, of the Ministers of the Supreme Federal Court [...]

It is noteworthy that the wording of item XI was edited by Constitutional Amendment no. 41/2003, and yet we see a gradual increase of government agents receiving extremely high salaries, exceeding the so‑called “constitutional ceiling,” the term defining the total salary limit combined with benefits to be received by all public servants in the public administration.

Bruno Carazza, in a Technical Note for the “Pessoas à Frente” Movement, mapped several public careers receiving salaries far above the constitutional ceiling, including judges, parliamentary advisers, members of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and other public service careers. In Carazza’s surveys, 93% of state judges received totals above the constitutional ceiling in 2023, considering annual totals; this repeats in 12 of the 26 states among members of the Public Ministry, where 91.5% of Prosecutors and Attorneys received more than the Ministers of the STF.

In the Federal Executive and Federal Legislature, that is, in the Chamber of Deputies and in the Senate, the percentage of employees receiving beyond the ceiling in 2023 was less than 1%, which shows that the biggest problem is concentrated in the Judiciary and the Public Prosecutor’s Office. But how is it possible that judges and members of the Public Prosecutor’s Office receive such high salaries? Well, as the Three Powers are independent from one another, each has administrative autonomy to organize itself and this includes defining remuneration, career plans, positions, salaries, but also professional benefits and advantages.

The so‑called “penduricalhos” (extra allowances) are indemnity amounts composed of food, health, transportation, housing, childcare and children’s schooling allowances, expense aids, and the countless career advantages that may sum to R$ 111,000, as in the case calculated in a G1 report, for a judge in the São Paulo Court of Justice: that is, considering the position and time in career, the judge should have earned R$ 39,717 “gross” (without deductions of taxes, allowances and advantages), but received R$ 80,000 above the constitutional ceiling (G1, 2025). It is worth saying that the judge, apart from supesalaries cases, is in general the career with the highest average monthly compensation, and still they are the ones who most complement their salary with allowances.

The “salary surplus” in the Judiciary amounted to R$ 9.76 billion in 2023, and even more problematic, much of it is non‑taxable, that is, amounts on which social security contributions, income tax, and some other types of taxation do not apply. Therefore, a small portion of the amounts paid in the Judiciary return to the public coffers in the form of taxes, generating a large and accelerated enrichment of magistrates compared to careers that require comparable levels of education and experience.

The “castes” of public service

The notion of “castes” in Brazilian public service, although metaphorical, points to a systemic flaw that goes beyond remuneration differences. The original text defines castes as careers with specific salaries and benefits that hierarchize privileges in society, highlighting the legal careers as the “highest caste.” The problem, however, is not just the amount of supersalaries, but their origin.

It is a reflection of the patrimonialism and clientelism of the Brazilian public administration’s history, which recently has been concerned with distinguishing the interest of the State from the private interest of its managers. The autonomy granted to each of the Three Powers to organize administratively and define their own compensation allowed this cultural heritage to institutionalize, creating a system of privileges.

The political implications of the long term are profound. While a minority of public servants in the Judiciary and in the Public Prosecutor’s Office enjoy earnings that exceed the constitutional ceiling, a large part of the frontline workforce — such as teachers and nurses — receives salaries close to the national average. This inequality creates a profound erosion of public trust, because citizens perceive that the state machine does not behave uniformly and does not reward merit equitably. Even more dangerous, the existence of a protected “caste,” with privileged status over compensation, creates a powerful force of resistance to any type of reform. By concentrating supersalaries predominantly in the Judiciary and in the Public Ministry, the problem becomes isolated in a sector with great political power to block changes, perpetuating the cycle of privileges and inequalities.

What lies ahead in the future?

In the National Congress, the Administrative Reform is advancing amid a political clash that exposes two distinct visions about the future of public service. On one side, its proponents argue that the proposal is essential to modernize the state machine, seeking to reduce expenses, correct wage distortions, and limit privileges in certain careers. On the other side, unions and experts warn that removing historic guarantees from civil servants may weaken impartiality and legality in public service, opening gaps for political persecution and compromising the security of careers and public institutions, as well as favoring hiring of unqualified personnel for strategic roles in the public administration. The central point of the debate, therefore, is whether it will be possible to achieve efficiency and transparency without undermining the very foundations that sustain society’s trust in Brazilian public institutions — and to balance the books. Only the future will tell whether the Administrative Reform will succeed, or whether it will be just another case of failure among the reforms.

References

CARAZZA, Bruno. Além do teto: Análises e Contribuições para o fim dos supersalários.

2024. Nota técnica - Movimento Pessoas à Frente. Disponível em: https://movimentopessoasafrente.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/MPaF_NOTAS_TECNICA_SUPERSALARIOS_DEZ_2024-8.pdf. Acesso em 8 Setembro 2025.

COELHO, Daniela Mello, 2000. Elementos essenciais ao conceito de administração gerencial. Revista de informação legislativa, v. 37, n. 147, p. 257-262, jul./set. 2000. Administração pública, Brasil | Reforma administrativa, Brasil. Disponível em: http://www2.senado.leg.br/bdsf/handle/id/622. Acesso em 30 de Agosto de 2025.

BARBIÉRI, Luiz Felipe. Entenda o que são os supersalários dos funcionários públicos, que o governo quer restringir. Publicado em 13 Fevereiro de 2025. Disponível em https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2025/02/13/entenda-o-que-sao-os-supersalarios-dos-funcionarios-publicos-que-o-governo-quer-restringir.ghtml. Acesso em 17 Julho 2025.

LOPEZ, Felix; TELES, José. Atlas do Estado Brasileiro: Distribuição de remuneração nos níveis federativos (1985-2019) - Faixas de remuneração. Disponível em https://www.ipea.gov.br/atlasestado/download/239/distribuicao-de-remuneracao-nos-niveis-federativos-1985-2019-faixas-de-remuneracao#iniciodoconteudo. Acesso em 21 Agosto 2025.

Organização para Cooperação e Desenvolvimento Econômico - OCDE. Relatórios Econômicos OCDE: Brasil. Fevereiro de 2018. DIsponível em https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/pt/publications/reports/2018/02/oecd-economic-surveys-brazil-2018_g1g89b03/9789264290716-pt.pdf. Acesso em 17 Julho 2025.

Tesouro Nacional. Despesa de Pessoal do Poder Executivo Federal alcança R$ 260 bilhões no

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